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One of the most widely discussed phenomena in American politics today is the perceived 
increasing  partisan divide that splits the U.S. electorate. A central contested question is 
whether this diagnosis is actually true, and if so, what is the underlying cause. We develop a 
model that relates the parties’ positions on economic and “cultural” issues, the voters’ ideal 
positions and the electorate’s voting behavior, and apply the model to U.S. presidential 
elections between 1972 and 2008. The model allows us to recover candidates’ positions from 
voter behavior; to decompose changes in the overall political polarization of the electorate 
into changes in the distribution of voter ideal positions and consequences of elite polarization; 
and to determine the characteristics of voters who changed their party allegiance. 
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February 21, 2012 1 Introduction
Polarization in Congress has increased substantially over the last 30 years, from a historic low achieved
between roughly 1940 and 1980 (Poole and Rosenthal 1984, 1985, 2000; Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder
1999; Theriault 2008). Today, Congressional polarization, as measured by the diﬀerence between the me-
dian Republican and Democratic ﬁrst-dimension Nominate-score is higher than ever in the last 100 years,
and this is true of House and Senate alike. Elite polarization also appears to be prevalent among party
activists (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008, Harbridge and Malhotra 2011).
In contrast, conclusions about mass polarization vary substantially in the literature. On the one hand,
many political commentators diagnose a sharp and increasing partisan divide that splits the U.S. electorate.
For example, the Economist writes that “the 50-50 nation appears to be made up of two big, separate voting
blocks, with only a small number of swing voters in the middle”, and that “America is more bitterly divided
than it has been for a generation”.1 Hetherington (2001) demonstrates that voters behave in an increas-
ingly partisan way (e.g. perceive important policy diﬀerences between the parties, and are less inclined to
vote split-ticket), and links this change in voter behavior to elite polarization. Similarly, Abramowitz and
Saunders (1998, 2008) provide evidence that Democratic and Republican party members have become more
liberal among Democrats and more conservative among Republicans.
On the other hand, not everybody shares the diagnosis of electoral polarization. In fact, research that
analyzes voter preferences on diﬀerent policy issues directly rather than voter behavior ﬁnds strong evidence
that the preferences of the American electorate on a number of policy issues are similar to what they were
a generation ago (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006; Bartels 2006; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Levendusky
2009). From this perspective, there does not appear to be a polarization in the sense that voters have moved
from moderate positions to more extreme ones (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Baker 2005).
The seeming tension between the observation of more partisan voter behavior on the one hand and no
fundamental change in voter preferences on the other is puzzling: If voters’ fundamental preferences on
issues did not change, why do they now act in more partisan ways? What is necessary to answer this funda-
mental question is a theoretical framework that provides for an explicit mechanism linking elite actions and
mass voting behavior. In this paper, we develop such a model. It distinguishes precisely among the concepts
of elite polarization, voter preference polarization, and voter behavior, and also allows us to estimate quan-
1“On His High Horse,” November 9, 2002 issue and “America’s Angry Election,” January 3, 2004 issue, respectively.
1titative measures of their development over the course of several elections. This model allows us to answer
the following important questions: First, have the masses in fact become more polarized, or is what has been
perceived and identiﬁed as polarization really just a reﬂection of changes in elite behavior? Second, to what
extent have elites and masses contributed, if at all, to changes in polarization? Third, is polarization driven
primarily by economic or by cultural issues, and which types of voters are most aﬀected by it?
In analyzing the third question, our model also contributes to an ongoing debate in the literature about
what type of issues – economic or cultural – drive vote choice today, and how their relative eﬀects might
have changed over time. A common impression is that moral issues have become more important in re-
cent years. For example, in the popular bestseller “What’s the matter with Kansas?”, Frank (2005) argues
that poor people often vote for Republicans because of cultural issues such as abortion or gay marriage,
while their economic interests would be more closely aligned with the Democratic party. Hunter (1992),
Shogan (2002) and Greenberg (2005) present similar “culture-war” arguments. Others challenge this thesis,
however, and emphasize the importance of economic issues in explaining voter preferences for candidates
(e.g., Bartels 2006; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Gelman, Shor, Bafumi, and Park 2008; Bartels
2010). Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder (2006) provide some mixed evidence, and show a substantially
increased importance of moral issues for vote choices in the 1990s relative to the 1970s and 80s, but also
ﬁnd that economic factors are still more important for voters than purely moral ones.
To gain an intuitive understanding of the eﬀects captured by the model, consider a society in which the
parties’ policy platforms are virtually indistinguishable. In this case, whether Democrats or Republicans
win hardly makes a diﬀerence for the implemented policy, so that voters may not base their vote choices on
their ideological preferences, but rather on their personal and idiosyncratic perceptions of the candidates.
When empirical researchers analyze the ideological determinants of voting behavior in this society, it looks
as if voters do not care about issues. However, if party elites become more polarized over time, creating
a more meaningful choice, then voters will expose previously buried ideological divisions among them,
even if their preferences remain constant: In short, elite polarization can beget voter behavior that appears
more polarized, but in reality is not. Moreover, whether voters appear to be more strongly polarized on
economic issues or on cultural ones depends crucially on whether the distance between the parties is larger
on economic or cultural issues.
That voters’ issue preferences more strongly aﬀect their vote choices, the more distant party positions
are from each other, assumes only rational behavior by voters and not changes in their underlying policy
2preferences. In other words, we do not assume that elite polarization on an issue “makes people think more
about that issue” and that they consequently develop more radical preferences on the issues. Rather, voters
always have preferences on the issues, and they are always aware of them – however, rational voters will not
to condition their vote choices on their issue preferences, if both candidates take the same policy stances.
This core intuition behind our structural model is present as a qualitative idea (and sometimes even as
reduced form model) in earlier work. Fiorina et al. (2006) point out that, in a multidimensional setting,
the direction of elite polarization has eﬀects for the direction of the fault line through the electorate, and
Hetherington (2001) shows that the intensity of elite polarization inﬂuences the intensity of voter polariza-
tion (see also Coleman (1996), Wattenberg (1998) and Bartels (2000) for earlier manifestations of similar
arguments).2
In particular, Fiorina et al. (2006, p. 183) point out that the eﬀect of elite polarization on voter behavior
constitutes a severe challenge for interpreting empirical studies that analyze the determinants of voter behav-
ior: “The ﬁndings of scores if not hundreds of electoral studies are ambiguous. The problem most deeply
aﬄicts attempts to study electoral change by conducting successive cross-sectional analyses and compar-
ing the results.” For example, consider a hypothetical study that analyzes how voters’ preferred positions
on abortion aﬀect their voting behavior, and compares voters in the 1970s to voters today. Suppose that
the researcher ﬁnds a signiﬁcant increase in the probit regression coeﬃcient of the abortion variable, which
means that a voter’s position on abortion today provides a more informative signal about his vote choice than
in the 1970s. It is tempting to interpret such a result as “abortion has become a more important issue for
voters.” However, the result does not necessarily mean that voters in the 1970s had less intense preferences
on the issue of abortion; it might rather be a consequence of stronger distinctions between Democratic and
Republican elites on this issue.
Our model provides a formal framework for analyzing the connection between elite actions (i.e., parties’
policy proposals), the distribution of voters’ policy preferences, and their voting behavior. The example
above shows that elite actions will inﬂuence how voters’ ideal positions on policy issues translate into vote
choices. Conversely, observing voters’ behavior provides information about the underlying actions of elites.
Using NES data from the U.S. presidential elections between 1972 and 2008, we show how we can use
observations of voter preferences on diﬀerent policy issues and voters’ choices of which candidate to vote
2Speciﬁcally, Hetherington (2001) shows that the diﬀerence between Republican and Democratic DW-Nominate scores in the
House as a measure of elite polarization is a highly signiﬁcant variable in regressions that use several diﬀerent measures of mass
polarization as dependent variables.
3for, to draw inferences about the diﬀerences between Democratic and Republican presidential candidates’
positions on diﬀerent issues during this time period.
Themodelalsoprovidesuswithabetterunderstandingoftheunderlyingcausesofelectoralpolarization:
Does the electorate look more politically polarized today than a generation ago, and if so, is elite polariza-
tion, a change in the voters’ preferences, or both responsible for this? To analyze these questions, we ﬁrst
deﬁne a measure of the electorate’s polarization on political issues. It quantiﬁes the degree to which voters’
candidatechoicesdependontheirpreferredissuepositions. Ourestimationprocedureprovidesadistribution
of voters’ ideal points and the positions of candidates, in diﬀerent elections. We can therefore synthetically
separate and quantitatively estimate the importance of the two potential reasons for changes in the over-
all polarization measure. In a ﬁrst thought-experiment, we ﬁx the candidates at their positions in a previous
election, and look at onlythose changes that arisefromchanges in thedistributionofvoterideal points alone.
We call this eﬀect “voter polarization.” Second, we ﬁx the electorate of an earlier election year and see how
this constant set of voters reacts to the observed change in the parties’ positions. We call this eﬀect “sorting.”
We further separate the two potential causes of sorting, policy divergence on cultural and on economic
issues, andusethistoinferthemarginalimportanceofculturalandeconomicpreferencesforvoters’choices.
For example, if most of the policy divergence between parties is on cultural issues, then the impact of
voters’ preferences on cultural issues for their vote choices will increase, relative to the impact of economic
issues. Again, however, this change reﬂects elite actions rather than represents genuine changes in voters’
preferences and in how they balance diﬀerent issues.
We also show that a turn in the direction of political conﬂict (e.g., an increased importance of cultural
issues relative to economic ones) changes the sets of voters who are likely to support Democrats and Re-
publicans, respectively. Speciﬁcally, our results shows how socially-conservative, but economically-liberal
voters have migrated from mostly supporting the Democrats in the 1970s to mostly supporting the Repub-
licans today, and that there is a group of socially-liberal but economically-conservative voters who migrate
in the opposite direction. Analyzing the ideological and social characteristics of these party switchers con-
tributes to the discussion among political practitioners, journalists and political scientists about the impacts
of cultural and economic preferences on partisanship, and about the secular shift of white working class
voters (“Reagan Democrats”) to the Republican party.
In the next section, we provide an intuitive description of our model, before turning to the formal model
and estimation.
42 An intuitive description of our model and procedure
In our model, we assume that voters’ policy preferences are characterized by two parameters δ and θ that
measure their preferred positions on cultural and economic issues. Apart from a policy payoﬀ determined
by the candidates’ economic and cultural policy positions relative to a voter’s own position, each voter also
receives a non-policy payoﬀ from each candidate, which captures, like in a probabilistic voting model, both a
systematic component (e.g., the candidate’s competence) and an idiosyncratic component (e.g., how likable
a voter ﬁnds each candidate).
In Figure 1, points D and R indicate the two party platforms (i.e., the voter types for whom the par-
ties’ positions correspond to their ideal policy). Higher values of δ indicate a more “socially conservative”
cultural position, and higher values of θ indicate more “economically liberal” preferences (δ and θ are pa-
rameters in the voters’ utility function (1) on page 8). Culturally conservative voters who also prefer a
low level of spending support the Republican position on both issues, while culturally liberal voters who
also prefer a high level of spending support the Democratic position on both issues. These core supporters
are unlikely to have an idiosyncratic candidate-speciﬁc preference shock that outweighs their policy pref-
erences. In contrast, economically-conservative, but socially-liberal voters and economically-liberal, but
socially-conservative voters are less ﬁrm in their support, and the boundary line between the set of (likely)







































(b) Large policy diﬀerences
Figure 1: Platform diﬀerences and voter intensities
Due to the voters’ idiosyncratic preferences, the separating line in the economic-cultural space does not
perfectly separate actual Democratic from Republican voters, but separates only those who are more likely
to vote Democratic from those who are more likely to vote Republican. The intensity of a voter’s policy
5preferences determines how likely he is to “cross over” to the policy-wise less preferred candidate. The
locus of the separating line is the same in both panels of Figure 1. However, in the left panel, candidate
positions are quite close, and the importance of idiosyncratic non-policy preferences is high: The transition
in terms of the implied probability of voting Republican is rather gradual, with voters above the dividing
line slightly more likely to vote Democrat, and those below the line slightly more likely to vote Republican.
In contrast, policy diﬀerences between candidates in the right panel are large. While voters who are
located exactly on the dividing line are still equally likely to prefer the Democrat and the Republican, those
voters who are located slightly oﬀ that line are now much more likely to prefer the candidate on their side of
the dividing line to his opponent, as policy diﬀerences have become more important relative to idiosyncratic
non-policy preferences.
For each voter whose ideal positions we know, we can calculate a probability that this voter will vote
Republican in an election. This probability can be used to make a prediction (i.e., if this probability is
greater/smaller than 1/2, we predict that the voter votes Republican/Democrat). Of course, the prediction
willsometimesbewrong, andwecanformameasureofhowusefulknowledgeofvoters’preferredpositions
is, onaverage, formakingsuchpredictionsbasedonhowoftenourpredictioniscorrect. Wecallthismeasure
predictiveness, and compare changes in it over time.
The argument above discussing Figure 1 suggests one possible reason for an intertemporal increase in
predictiveness: Elite polarization (i.e., the movement of candidate platforms) generates the appearance of
a more “politically divided” electorate, in the sense that ideal points of voters who are not exactly on the
dividing line become better predictors of voting behavior. Alternatively, predictiveness can increase because
voters (on average) move away from the dividing line, and this means that an external observer who learns
the voters’ ideal issue positions can, on average, make better predictions about voting behavior, even if
the candidates’ positions are unchanged. We call the ﬁrst eﬀect “sorting” and the second one (electoral)
“polarization.” Of course, between two actual elections, both eﬀects arise simultaneously, but our model
can synthetically separate these eﬀects, so that we learn which one is quantitatively more important for the
observed increase in political divisions.
What does voter behavior tell us about candidate platforms? First, from the discussion above, it is clear
that the extent to which the two voter blocs can be neatly divided by a line enables us to infer how far apart
the two candidates’ positions are. Second, the data also reveal information about the relative diﬀerence
between party platforms in the economic and cultural dimension. To see this, consider Figure 2. In the
6left panel, the platforms of the two candidates diﬀer primarily along the economic dimension, while their
cultural positions are fairly close. As a result, the separation line is fairly ﬂat: Most Republicans have low
values of θ, while most Democrats have high values of θ. In the intermediate range, cultural preferences do
play a role, but the “marginal rate of substitution between economic and cultural issues” is low: Suppose
we start with a voter who is just indiﬀerent between the Democratic and Republican position. If this voter
becomes more socially conservative (i.e., if δ increases by one unit), how much does θ have to increase in
order to keep this voter on the separating line, i.e. just stochastically indiﬀerent between candidates? We


























(b) Primarily cultural voter separation
Figure 2: Voter separation lines
Changingfromthelefttotherightpanel, theimportanceofculturalrelativetoeconomicissuesincreases,
i.e., the dividing line becomes steeper. The reason for the pivot of the separating line is the change of
the Democratic and Republican positions – cultural diﬀerences between the candidates have become more
pronounced relative to the left panel, and economic ones less so. Consequently, the polity has become more
divided along cultural lines. Note that the slope of the dividing line depends solely on the diﬀerence between
the candidates’ economic and social positions. An increased importance of cultural relative to economic
issues is not driven by voters “becoming more concerned” with cultural issues and/or less concerned with
economic issues. If the distribution of voter preferences changes, e.g. probability mass shifting from the
middle of the distribution to more extreme positions, this is a completely separate eﬀect that leaves the
dividing line unchanged (though it aﬀects how many voters “cross-over” to the other party).
Finally, we can analyze the types of voters who switched their party allegiance as a result of changing
party platforms. Think of a graph that superimposes the two panels of Figure 2. A pivot of the dividing line
has the eﬀect that socially-liberal and economically-conservative voters move to the Democratic party, while
7socially-conservative and economically-liberal voters move to the Republican party.3 From our estimation,
we can identify those ideological voter types who are most likely to switch their allegiance from Democrats
to Republicans and vice versa, and we can then look in the data for the demographic characteristics of these
voters. For example, do those socially-conservative and economically-liberal voter types who we identify
as most likely to have shifted from Democrats to Republicans indeed look like the “Reagan Democrats” or
the “angry white religious fundamentalists” that have been described in the popular literature?
3 Model
Two candidates, labeled D and R, are endowed with a cultural-ideological position δP ∈ [0,1], P ∈ {D,R},
an economic position gP that denotes the quantity of a public good that the candidate provides if elected,
and an associated cost of public good provision cP.4 Each voter is characterized by his cultural ideology
δ ∈ [0,1]; a parameter θ ∈ [0,1] that determines his preferences for public goods, and a parameter ξP ∈ R
that measures the impact of the personal charisma of the candidate P = D,R on the voter. Speciﬁcally, a
voter’s utility from candidate P is given by
u(δ,θ,ξP) = θv(gP) − cP − (δ − δP)2 + ξP. (1)
Note that v(·) is an increasing and strictly concave function that is the same for all voters. Since a voter’s
gross utility from public goods is θ · v(g), high θ-types receive a higher payoﬀ from public goods and thus,
their preferred public good provision level, accounting for the cost of provision, is higher than for low θ-
types.5 We assume that there is a continuous distribution of (δ,θ,ξD,ξR) in the electorate, that θ ∈ [0,1],6
and that ξ ≡ ξR −ξD is independent of θ and δ. A voter is indiﬀerent between the two candidates if and only
3Note that the two-dimensional nature of policy in our model is essential for this part of the analysis because it allows for
movement (by diﬀerent groups) in both directions.
4For simplicity and in order to focus on the eﬀects of cultural and economic policy divergence on voter behavior, we use a
model in which policy choices are exogenous. However, one could, for example, modify a diﬀerentiated candidate framework to
obtain policy divergence as an equilibrium result (Krasa and Polborn 2009, 2010a, 2010b). In particular, Krasa and Polborn (2011)
show this for voter utility functions very similar to the ones used here. Alternatively, Schnidman and Schoﬁeld (2011) present an
alternative model of non-convergence of party positions in a two-dimensional policy space. Their main driving force is the presence
of policy-motivated party activists who support the candidates conditional on their policy choices.
5We could generalize the utility function to u(P,g) = θv(g) − cP − s(δ − δP)2 + ξP, where s > 0. The case s = 1 corresponds to
(1), and higher s means that voters put more emphasis on cultural issues. By setting χ =
√
s(δ− ¯ δ)+ ¯ δ, for arbitrary ¯ δ we can write
the new utility function as u(P,g) = θv(g) − cP − (χ − χP)2 + ξP, which is exactly the same form (1) (just with χ replacing δ). Thus,
our assumption that the parameter multiplying the ideological loss (δ − δP)2 is one is without loss of generality.
6This is just a normalization because v() can take arbitrary values.
8if θv(gD) − cD − (δ − δD)2 + ξD = θv(gR) − cR − (δ − δR)2 + ξR, which implies
−2δ(δR − δD) + (v(gD) − v(gR))θ = cD − cR − (δ2
R − δ2
D) + ξ. (2)
We assume that the Democrat provides (weakly) more of the public good (i.e., gD ≥ gR) for a higher tax
cost (i.e., cD ≥ cR), and that the Republican is (weakly) to the right of the Democrat on cultural issues (i.e.,
δR ≥ δD).7
For any given value of ξ, if gD = gR, the line of indiﬀerent or cutoﬀ voters in a (δ,θ)-space is vertical.
Intuitively, if Democrat and Republican provide the same amount of public goods, then only the voters’
ideological preferences (δ) matter for their voting choice, while the voters’ economic preference (θ) is im-
material. If, instead, gD > gR, the cutoﬀ value for θ is given by
θ(δ,ξ,gD,gR) =





Equation (3) is a straight line in the δ-θ space, and has a positive slope. Intuitively, if the Democrat provides
more public goods than the Republican, then a voter is indiﬀerent between the candidates either if he is
socially relatively liberal, but wants lower spending on public goods (i.e., low δ and low θ), or if he is
socially conservative, but likes substantial government spending on public goods (i.e., high δ and high θ).
Higher types of θ are more likely to vote for the Democrat, and for any given economic preference type θ,
higher δ-types are more likely to vote for the Republican.
4 Estimating the Model
4.1 Overview
Our objective is to determine how a respondent’s answers to the survey questions translates into a position
in the δ-θ-space, and a probability of voting Republican. Our model shows that the position of the separating
lineisdeterminedbythecandidates’positionsandmaythereforechangefromoneelectiontothenext. Thus,
we estimate voters’ preference parameters δ and θ simultaneously with ξ and the position of the separating
7From a theoretical point of view, these are mere normalizations: We can simply call the candidate who provides more public
good the “Democrat,” and measure δ in a way that the Democrat’s position is weakly to the left of the Republican’s. As we will see
below, these normalizations make sense empirically in the U.S. context.
9line. Speciﬁcally, we proceed as follows: Equation (3) implies that the slope, k, and the intercept, a, of the





cD(gD) − cR(gR) − (δ2
R − δ2
D) + ¯ ξ
v(gD) − v(gR)
. (4)
where ¯ ξ = E[ξ]. Deﬁne
ε =
ξ − ¯ ξ
v(gD) − v(gR)
(5)
We assume that ε is normally distributed with standard deviation σ (given the normalization in (5), the mean
of ε is 0). Equations (3), (4) and (5) imply that a citizen votes Republican if and only if
θ − kδ − a − ε < 0. (6)
Let Xi, i = 1,...,n and Yi, i = 1,...,m be random variables that describe the answers to survey questions on
cultural and economic issues, respectively. From these data, we construct an index of cultural and economic
preferences. Speciﬁcally, we assume that δ =
Pn
i=1 λiXi and θ =
Pm
i=1 µiYi, where, of course, the λi and µi
are parameters to be estimated.
We normalize Xi and Yi such that (i) the lowest and highest realizations for each question are 0 and 1;
(ii) high values on Xi and Yi increase the estimated value of δ and θ, respectively (i.e., we code answers such
that all λi and µi are non-negative).8 Finally, we normalize
Pn
i=1 λi = 1 and
Pm
i=1 µi = 1 so that θ,δ ∈ [0,1],
to keep the distribution of θ and δ comparable over time. This normalization is without loss of generality
because multiplying all variables in (6) by a positive constant will not change whether (6) is satisﬁed.9
Let Φ(·) denote the cdf of a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Then (6) implies
that the probability that a voter votes Republican is given by
Φ













     

     . (7)
In principle, this objective function is similar to a probit model. However, the challenge is that, unlike in a
standard probit model, the argument of Φ is not a linear function of the model parameters to be estimated.
8We can do (ii) without loss of generality by redeﬁning a new variable ˆ Xi = 1−Xi (or ˆ Yi = 1−Yi) if the corresponding coeﬃcient
λi (or µi) in a regression using the original answers Xi or Yi is negative.
9In the estimation, multiplying all variables in (6) by the same constant leaves the parameter estimate for k unchanged and
multiplies the estimate of the standard deviation of ε accordingly.
10We now describe how the model can be used to identify changes in the distance between the candidates’





where σξ is the standard deviation of ξ.10 Using (4) implies
δD,j − δR,j =
σξkj
2σj




We can use (16) and (17) to estimate the values σj and kj from the data of the election in year j (as described
in more detail in Theorem 1 below). This allows us to identify both the cultural and economic diﬀerence in
the candidates’ platforms, if we normalize the policy diﬀerence v(gD) − v(gR) in a base year.
In Section 4.2, which the more substantively interested reader can skip, we provide more technical
details on the estimation procedure.
4.2 Estimation Procedure
In order to get the best estimate of voters’ values of δ and θ, we estimate λ and µ using pooled data from
several elections. Because candidate platforms change from one election to the next, this means that we must
allow that k and σ change over time and thus index them by the year of the election. Let Dt, t = 1,..., s
be the year dummy for year t = 1,... s (i.e., Dt = 1 if the observation occurred in year t, and 0 otherwise).
Then (7) generalizes to
Φ







     






     














     

     . (10)
In order to determine kt, at, σt, t = 1,..., s, λi, i = 1,...,n, and µi, i = 1,...,m, we ﬁrst estimate the model
in which the probability of voting Republican is given by
Φ

     






     

     
n X
i=1
˜ λi ˜ Xi

      −






     

     
m X
i=1
˜ µi ˜ Yi






     , (11)
10Here, σξ is assumed constant over time. We discuss this assumption in Section 7.3.
11where there are no restrictions on the ˜ λi, and ˜ µi, i.e., they could be negative or greater than 1. ˜ Xi and ˜ Yi are
the responses to the survey questions, solely normalized to be between 0 and 1, but absent the additional
requirement that higher realizations of the response to each question increase δ and θ.
Denote by dt,j, ˜ xi,j, and ˜ yi,j observation j of random variables Dt, ˜ Xi, and ˜ Yi, respectively. Let
zj =

     

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     











     , (12)
and let vj = 1 if the voter in observation j votes Republican, and vj = 0 if he votes Democrat. To estimate
αi, βi, ˜ λi, ˜ µi, and ˜ ai, we maximize the log-likelihood function, i.e., solve
max
{αi,ρi|i=2,...,s},{˜ ai|i=1,...,s},{˜ λi|i=1,...,n},{˜ µi|i=1,...,m}
J X
j=1





We use Newton’s method to determine a zero of the ﬁrst order condition of this maximization problem.
Note that, in contrast to a standard probit model, zj is not a linear function of the model parameters. This
generates some numerical challenges, as the region of convergence is relatively small, thus requiring a good
start value.11 The computer code for performing the estimation can be obtained from the authors. Theorem 1
shows how the parameter estimates of (13) translate into parameters of the original model.
Theorem 1 Deﬁne ρ1 = α1 = 1. Let αt, ρt and ˜ at for t ∈ {1,..., s}; ˜ λi, i ∈ {1,...,n}; ˜ µi, i ∈ {1,...,m}, be
the parameters of the modiﬁed model in (11). Then the parameters of the original model (10) are determined
as follows:




























11We obtain such a start value by ﬁrst optimizing over ˜ λi, ˜ µi and ˜ ai, use the resulting solution as a start value for optimizing over
αi, ρi, and ˜ ai. Starting from this value, convergence can be obtained for the complete optimization problem.
















5. The vertical intercept of the separating line in the (δ,θ) space in period t is
at =
˜ at − (1 + ρt)
Pm







Afterdeterminingweights(λ,µ)forasetofbaseyears, wecandetermineδandθ byusing(14). Diﬀerent
base years give slightly diﬀerent results because which preferred policy positions are economically and
culturally “conservative” (i.e., leaning towards the Republican position) may change over time. Diﬀerent
approaches have diﬀerent advantages. Pooling all years gives us the largest data set and compares all years
against a common benchmark. In contrast, focusing on late base years has the advantage of measuring
people’s preferences in a way that is more consistent with what is considered economically and culturally
liberal or conservative today as opposed to an average over the last generation, and this the approach that we
will choose for the main part of the paper. However, it should be noted that our main results are not sensitive
with respect to the choice of the base period.
For given values of (δ,θ) (i.e., obtained for (λ,µ) from ﬁxed base years), estimating k, a, and σ for a





[kδi − θi + a]
!
. (19)
We can estimate this model by ﬁrst estimating
Φ(βδδi − βθθi + βa), (20)











Of course, if we compare the values that we get from a direct estimation of (13), and the values obtained by
this simpliﬁed method in a year that is one of the base years used in the estimation of (13) (i.e., using the
values of (δ,θ) obtained from the direct estimation), then we get identical values for k, σ and a.
5 Concepts and Data
Economic and cultural issues. It is useful to start by deﬁning what we mean by economic and cultural
issues. We think of economic policies as those policies that aﬀect net personal income or consumption of
public goods directly for a signiﬁcant number of people. For example, this policy area would contain the
level of taxation and of public good provision, legislation aﬀecting the power of unions in wage bargaining,
and general business regulation aﬀecting proﬁts and capital incomes.
In contrast, the notion of cultural issues is somewhat more amorphous. In our view, policies in this area
have to do with the government regulating or inﬂuencing behavior, and most people care about these policies
even if they are not personally aﬀected one way or the other. For example, most heterosexual voters have
a view on gay marriage, even though the legality of gay marriage does not aﬀect their eﬀective personal
choice set (i.e., marrying someone from the opposite gender, or not marrying) at all. Clearly, those policies
labeled “moral issues” by Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder (2006) fall into this category. However, there
are other policy issues that do, too, but are not “moral issues” in a narrow sense.12 For example, people diﬀer
widely in whether they see the U.S. as a force for good in the world that should impose its policy preferences
on other countries, often by using military means.13 Related to this speciﬁc example is the whole complex
of patriotism/jingoism which is also broached by Frank (2005) as an important cultural wedge issue.
We use data from the post-election survey of the American National Election Survey for Presidential
election years during the time period from 1972 to 2008. We considered all questions that were continu-
12We discuss the quantitative robustness to the deﬁnition of cultural/moral issues in Section 7.1, where we restrict the cultural
factors to purely moral ones.
13Of course, one could expand the deﬁnition of the “moral” category to cover these cases. It is not immediately obvious why
the legality of abortion for U.S. residents is a “moral” issue, but the consequences of U.S. military occupation in foreign countries
(whether killing children as collateral damage in drone strikes, or enabling girls to go to school) are not a “moral” issue.
14ously available between 1972 and 2008 and could be identiﬁed as either cultural or economic.14 As a result,
we use the following questions in order to determine the cultural ideology index δ of a voter: Questions
VCF0837 (1980 and before) and VCF0838 (1984 and after) about whether abortion should be always legal,
mostly legal, mostly illegal or always illegal; Question VCF0834 about the role of women, with answers
ranging from “Women and men should have an equal role” to “Women’s place is in the home”; Question
VCF0206, about the respondent’s thermometer score feeling towards blacks; Question VCF0830, about af-
ﬁrmative action and the government’s responsibility to help minorities, with answers ranging from “Govern-
ment should help minority groups/blacks” to “Minority groups/ blacks should help themselves”; Question
VCF0213 about the respondent’s thermometer score towards the U.S. military; Question VCF0130 about
church attendance, which we use as a dummy with 1 for respondents who go to church weekly or almost
every week.
For economic preferences, we use the following questions: Question VCF0809 on the role of the govern-
ment in the economy, with answers ranging from “Government should see to job and good standard of liv-
ing”to“Governmentshouldleteachpersongetaheadonhisown”; QuestionsVCF0209andVCF0210about
the respondent’s thermometer scores towards unions and “big business”, respectively; Question VCF0114
about family income. Here, respondents are put into 5 groups according to how their income compares with
the percentiles of the U.S. income distribution.
The thermometer issues we include measure the respondents’ aﬃnity to certain groups, which we inter-
pret as proxies for policy issues. For example, we believe that the attitude towards unions and big business
should be a good proxy for right-to-work legislation or business regulation in general. We interpret the ques-
tion about aid to minorities as primarily about aﬃrmative action and hence more cultural than economic.
With respect to the patriotism/chauvinism complex, there is unfortunately no direct question about national-
ism; but since chauvinism (i.e., extreme nationalism characterized especially by a belligerent foreign policy)
requires power projection by means of armed forces, the attitude towards the military is a useful proxy.
No demographic variables. We do not include demographic measures such as gender, race or age because
we believe it is more useful to take the voter’s preferences on policy issues as a measure of his ideological
position. It is certainly true that a voter’s demographic characteristics inﬂuence his preferred positions. For
example, women have on average a more liberal position on abortion rights than men, so if one did not know
14Because we need continuously available questions, we start our analysis in 1972, as moving to the 1960s would have meant
losing a substantial number of questions.
15a voter’s preferences on abortion, including information on the voter’s gender is a useful proxy for preferred
positions. However, since the NES has information on policy preferences, we prefer to use this information
directly. The idea is that, controlling for the respondent’s opinion about abortion and the role of women, the
respondent’s gender does not provide much additional information about the voter’s preferences.15
We do not include any measure of partisan aﬃliation or self-placement on a one-dimensional liberal-
to-conservative scale. Including such a measure would defy the purpose of our analysis. We want to know
which policy-preferences (on both the economic and the cultural dimension) translate into a preference for
the candidate of one of the parties. Regressing individuals’ vote choices for Democrats or Republicans on
whether the individuals feel attached to either party is not very helpful.
Similarly, the liberal-conservative scale is not helpful because it collapses the two dimensions of our
interest into one: For example, if a voter claims to be moderate, is that because he is a social liberal but a
ﬁscalconservative, orasocialconservativebutaﬁscalliberal, oramoderateinbothdimensions? Also, when
comparing the distribution of political self-identiﬁcation over a long time period, it is unclear whether the
social constructs of “liberal”, “moderate” and “conservative” mean the same to voters in 2004 as they meant
in 1972. Attitudes on particular political issues that made an individual reasonably classiﬁed as “liberal” or
“conservative” some decades ago may today lead to a diﬀerent classiﬁcation, and a diﬀerent voting behavior.
Our model allows us to analyze how this reclassiﬁcation has played out over the last 35 years with respect
to economic and cultural positions.
Missing issues and bias. Finally, it is useful to discuss the impact of data limitations on our results.
Suppose that the true relationship for year t has the same structure as the model we estimate, but has δ and θ
inﬂuenced by more issues than we have data for: δ =
PN
i=1 λiXi and θ =
PM
i=1 µiYi, where N > n and M > m
(i.e., we have data only on the ﬁrst n and m issues, respectively, but the true model is determined by all N and
M issues). This problem may arise particularly acutely because we have to restrict ourselves to questions
that were asked in the NES in every year from 1972 to 2008. Clearly, missing some issues on the cultural
dimension will lead to an underestimate of the importance of cultural issues relative to economic issues,
and vice versa. Moreover, missing questions implies that we will ascribe more variation to the idiosyncratic
shock ε than justiﬁed in the true model. Thus, the absolute value of k should not be over-interpreted in the
15In fact, we have run our regression including a number of demographic controls, and with some exceptions, they have turned
out to be small and often insigniﬁcant. Also, dummies for the major religious groups (Protestants, Catholics) turned out to be very
close to zero and statistically insigniﬁcant.
16sense that k < 1 (k > 1) implies that “cultural issues are less (more) important than economic issues.” The
value of k depends, among other things, on which questions we use for our measurement of economic and
cultural preferences and therefore, how well measured preferences reﬂect “true” preferences on economic
and cultural issues. If, for example, we measure cultural preferences much better than economic ones, then k
is higher than it would be if we measured economic preferences in a better way. However, the interpretation
of the development of variables over time is not systematically aﬀected by this problem as long as the true
issue weights (of the included and omitted issues) do not change systematically over time.
Which type of systematic change of the issue weights of included and omitted variables over time can
we expect? Presumably, the committee deciding on which questions to ask in the NES has some notion
of the importance of diﬀerent issues that guides their decision – when a new issue becomes suﬃciently
important in political discourse, a new question will be included, and if the importance of an existing issue
falls below some threshold, its usage will be discontinued. However, since continuity of questions is a very
important feature for many studies, the importance threshold for inclusion is presumably higher than the
threshold for exclusion. Thus, if a question remains in the NES for the whole period between 1972 and
2008, the NES committee must have felt in 1972 that its importance warranted inclusion, and its importance
remained suﬃciently high over the entire period to prevent exclusion. Issues that became important within
this time period, but were not yet suﬃciently important to be included in 1972 are not in our data set so that
we would expect that the sum of the true normalized weights of the questions included in our analysis may
have been higher in 1972 than in 2008.16 If this is the case, then our estimate of the degree to which policy
positions inﬂuence voting behavior is biased downward late in our sample period (relative to the estimate in
early years), as too much variation is attributed to idiosyncratic shocks rather than unmeasured variations in
a voter’s position. Fortunately, in the empirical results, the inﬂuence of policy positions on voting behavior
increases signiﬁcantly even without taking into account this bias, which strengthens our results.
16For example, a respondent’s attitude towards gay people is now probably a good predictor of social conservatism, but in the
1970s, the NES did not contain any questions on this complex. Similarly, we would suspect that a question about the respon-
dent’s conﬁdence in scientiﬁc results (say, in evolution or global warming) would be more informative about a respondent’s social
conservatism today than it was 40 years ago.
176 Empirical Results
6.1 Probit regression for δ and θ
Table 1 reports the values of ˜ λ, ˜ µ, λ, and µ for two diﬀerent pooled base periods, the ﬁrst ﬁve elections (1972-
1988) and the last ﬁve presidential elections (1992-2008). Below the point estimates for each parameter, we
report the corresponding 95 percent conﬁdence interval (obtained by using bootstrap resampling).
(˜ λ, ˜ µ)1972−1988 (˜ λ, ˜ µ)1992−2008 (λ,µ)1972−1988 (λ,µ)1992−2008
military (thermometer) 1.183 1.254 0.331 0.308
[0.819,1.601] [0.911,1.672] [0.269,0.393] [0.248,0.369]
aid to minorities (high answers 0.543 0.618 0.152 0.152
= against aid to minorities) [0.335,0.760] [0.401,0.852] [0.093,0.209] [0.099,0.205]
black (thermometer) -1.294 -0.912 0.362 0.224
[-1.728,-0.924] [-1.303,-0.589] [0.297,0.426] [0.161,0.283]
role of women (high answers 0.147 0.454 0.041 0.112
= women’s place is in the house) [-0.014,0.320] [0.250,0.691] [0.003,0.088] [0.063,0.162]
abortion (high answers -0.304 -0.746 0.085 0.183
= should be legal) [-0.479,-0.142] [-0.977,-0.559] [0.041,0.128] [0.143,0.227]
attends church 0.106 0.082 0.030 0.020
[0.004,0.214] [-0.027,0.187] [0.004,0.057] [0.001,0.045]
income -0.541 -0.665 0.122 0.159
[-0.722,-0.363] [-0.887,-0.469] [0.084,0.159] [0.119,0.199]
big business (thermometer) -1.458 -0.818 0.330 0.196
[-1.815,-1.155] [-1.154,-0.537] [0.289,0.371] [0.140,0.249]
union (thermometer) 1.478 1.739 0.334 0.416
[1.194,1.813] [1.421,2.124] [0.295,0.374] [0.367,0.468]
government standard of living -0.947 -0.962 0.214 0.230
(high answer = no gov. welfare) [-1.184,-0.735] [-1.226,-0.740] [0.178,0.252] [0.187,0.274]
Table 1: Estimation of Parameters; 95 percent conﬁdence interval
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 1 show the expected eﬀects of political positions on voting behavior.
Remember that our model is normalized in a way that a high value of the cultural index δ and a low value
of the preference for public goods, θ, increase a voter’s likelihood of voting Republican. Consequently,
Table 1 indicates that a person is more culturally conservative (i.e., high δ) if he likes the military; is against
special government support for minorities; feels “less warm” towards blacks, believes that caring for the
family is better for women than working outside the home; believes that abortion should be illegal; and
attends church weekly or almost every week. A person is more economically conservative (i.e., low θ) if
he has a high income; likes big business; dislikes unions; and does not feel that government should provide
18guaranteed jobs and a standard of living for everyone.
The third and fourth column report the implied values for the λi and µi. Remember that these are
normalized so that they are positive and sum to 1, respectively. The values can be interpreted as the relative
weight of diﬀerent issues in determining whether a person is culturally or economically conservative. Since
answers are normalized such that they go from 0 to 1, the value of λi is the eﬀect on the value of δ that arises
when a respondent changes from the most liberal answer in question i to the most conservative one.
Overall, the importance of diﬀerent issues for the determination of the cultural and economic scores are
relatively stable when comparing the earlier and the later period. In terms of cultural issues, the gender-
speciﬁc questions (role of women, abortion) increase in importance, while the importance of racial relations
decreases. For the measurement of economic preferences, the opinion about unions gains some importance
relative to the opinion on big business.
We choose the 1992-2008 weights as the standard base because they reﬂect best what identiﬁes voters’
cultural and economic conservatism today (rather than more than 20 years ago). We report only results based
on the 1992-2008 weights but ﬁgures for the two alternative bases (1972-1988, and 1972-2008; available on
request) show that the choice of base period does not matter qualitatively for our results.
We now analyze how much the distribution of voter ideal points on these two dimensions changed over
time. Note that this is a logically independent concept – the preference distribution may change signiﬁcantly
even if the determining factors of conservatism remain constant. Table 2 reports the average values of δ and
θ (based on (λ,µ)1992−2008) for all years between 1972 and 2008, as well as the corresponding standard
deviations for both voters and non-voters.
year av. δ std δ av. θ std θ corr.
1972 0.500 0.149 0.496 0.149 -0.190
1976 0.502 0.142 0.451 0.154 -0.121
1980 0.485 0.135 0.486 0.151 -0.190
1984 0.470 0.140 0.495 0.156 -0.193
1988 0.491 0.133 0.478 0.159 -0.208
1992 0.466 0.137 0.477 0.153 -0.242
1996 0.489 0.130 0.474 0.150 -0.249
2000 0.486 0.125 0.485 0.150 -0.293
2004 0.490 0.143 0.502 0.159 -0.372
2008 0.483 0.139 0.534 0.171 -0.427
(a) Voters
year av. δ std δ av. θ std θ corr.
1972 0.526 0.151 0.521 0.156 -0.141
1976 0.489 0.135 0.493 0.145 -0.089
1980 0.478 0.140 0.532 0.162 -0.105
1984 0.486 0.132 0.537 0.134 0.002
1988 0.491 0.131 0.534 0.153 -0.062
1992 0.493 0.119 0.536 0.152 -0.135
1996 0.477 0.127 0.537 0.138 -0.115
2000 0.482 0.143 0.526 0.151 -0.057
2004 0.492 0.131 0.545 0.156 -0.215
2008 0.493 0.128 0.547 0.145 -0.159
(b) Nonvoters
Table 2: Cultural and economic indices: Average and standard deviation
19The average δ and θ move around in a relatively unsystematic way over time. Looking at the develop-
ment of the standard deviations, it is also quite apparent that there is no clear time trend. The distribution
of economic or cultural issue preferences certainly does not become a lot more polarized over time, as this
would require a substantial increase in the standard deviations. This conﬁrms the results of DiMaggio,
Evans, and Bryson (1996), Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2006) and Fiorina and Abrams (2008) who all ﬁnd
that overall issue preferences of American voters have remained mostly stable over time.
Table 2 reports the ideological distribution of voters and nonvoters in the corresponding years. The
correlation between economic and cultural conservatism among voters (the left table) has increased from a
low of −0.12 in 1976 to −0.43 in 2008. Since high values of δ and low values of θ correspond to cultural
and economic conservatism, this means that the two types of conservatism are today more closely related
among voters, although that correlation is still not perfect. While it is often claimed that voting behavior of
members of Congress has become essentially one-dimensional in recent years, it will be quite clear from the
ﬁgures in the next subsection that such a claim cannot be made for the American electorate at-large.
The right part of Table 2 reports the ideological distribution of nonvoters in the corresponding years.
There is not much of a systematic diﬀerence between voter and nonvoters on cultural issues, but nonvoters
tend to be on average more liberal than voters on economic issues. A plausible interpretation is that (some)
liberals face substantially higher costs of voting, for example, because of poor organization and therefore
longer voting lines in inner cities, so that they are more likely to abstain. It is also interesting that, among
non-voters, the correlation between the two types of conservatism is weaker and does not follow a clear
trend over time.
6.2 Platform Diﬀerentiation
We now turn to the changes in the distance between the candidates’ platforms. Recall from equation (9) in
Section 4.1 that the model identiﬁes changes in the policy distance, relative to the distance in the base year.
We chose 1976 as base year since divergence on both policies is lowest in that year. Figure 3 displays the
results for cultural and economic positions.
The diﬀerence between the two parties’ cultural positions, δR − δD increases by more than 200 percent
in all years after 1992, and by about 300 percent in the last decade. For economic positions, the change
in the distance between positions is considerably smaller; the maximum increase is about 50 percent in





















































































Figure 3: Cultural and economic policy divergence of candidates, 1972 to 2008
1996. However, we should stress that our method only allows us to identify changes of the distance in
cultural positions relative to the same distance in 1976, and many researchers have argued that the parties’
positions on “moral issues” (a subset of our cultural issues here) were quite close to each other in the 1970s
(e.g. Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006; Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2006), while the distance on
economic issues may have been more substantial already in the base year.
It is useful to contrast our model and its implications about the polarization of candidate platforms
in presidential elections with Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-nominate score that measures polarization in
Congress. The DW-nominate score is based on legislators’ votes in Congress. Party polarization is com-
monly operationalized by considering the diﬀerence between the average Democratic and the average Re-
publican score. The positions of presidential candidates usually cannot be compared using the DW-nominate
measures because very rarely, both candidates serve in Congress during the same time period and thus voting
on the same laws (Obama vs. McCain in 2008 was the only exception to this in the recent past, and clearly,
a single data point does not tell us anything about the development of polarization over time).
In contrast, our method is based on comparing the behavior of voters, and thus on their understanding
of what the diﬀerences between candidates are. Crucially, our data have a measure of the voters’ preferred
positions, as well as their vote choices. This allows us to reconstruct both the importance of economic
and cultural positions for vote choices and a measure of the distance between policy platforms on both the
cultural and the economic dimension.
216.3 Polarization and Sorting of the Electorate
Figure 4 provides some insights into the changing voting behavior of the electorate. It displays the values of
δ and θ for all voters, together with the voter’s choice (red for Republican, blue for Democrat). The left panel
is for the 1976 election, the right one for the 2004 election. In both panels, we have drawn the 50 percent
separating line, i.e., voters on this line have an implied probability of voting Republican or Democrat that is
exactly 1/2. Voters below and to the right of the separating line are more likely to vote for the Republican,
while voters above and to the left of the line are more likely to vote for the Democrat.


















Figure 4: Voter preferences and vote choices in the 1976 (left) and 2004 (right) U.S. Presidential elections.
Democratic voters in blue, Republican ones in red
Remember that the electorate’s voting behavior becomes more determined by policy preferences if the
two party platforms are farther apart from each other. Thus, we expect that the increase in policy divergence
is reﬂected in a cleaner separation of the voting blocks in 2004, and this is exactly what we see in Figure 4.
It is useful to provide a more formal measure for this separation eﬀect intuitively captured by the visual
comparison of elections. A natural way to measure the importance of policy positions for voter choices is the
following measure of position predictiveness, Ψ. Suppose that we have to predict the voting behavior of a
large group of voters in a tight election. If we did not have any information about these voters, we could not
do better than ﬂipping a coin, and this would give us a 50 percent “success quota.” Using information about
the preferred political positions of a voter enables us to make better predictions: We predict that a voter
22votes Republican (Democrat) whenever his position is below (above) the separating line, and the probability
of being correct for voter i with this prediction is simply Φ
￿
1
σt[ktδi − θi + at]
￿
, where (kt,at,σt) denote the
parameters for a separating line for year t. When we average this measure over all voters, we have a measure
of how important political issue preferences are for predicting voting behavior.
Note that a problem could arise in lopsided elections. For example suppose that 70 percent of voters
vote for the Republican candidate in an election because that candidate has a large expected valence ¯ ξ. Then
even a completely uninformed guesser could achieve a 70 percent success quota (by guessing that each voter
votes Republican). To avoid this problem, we adjust the valence such that the election would have ended
in a tie. More formally, we ﬁnd a new intercept a0
t such that the weighted vote share of the Democrat (and










i=1 wi = 0.5, where wi is the sample weight of voter i.17 We
then measure the quality of information about political positions by how much the success quota of our
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ is the increase in the success probability relative to a pure coin ﬂip,
and the factor 2 in front normalizes Ψ such that it lies between 0 and 1. For example, if knowledge of
political preferences allows to correctly forecast 80 percent of voters, then this is 2(0.8 − 0.5) = 60% better
than a pure coin ﬂip.
If Ψ = 1, society is extremely divided along ideological lines: Every conservative votes Republican,
and every liberal votes Democratic. This means that most voters would know which party they will vote for
before they know who are the actual candidates of each party – they are not going to give the other party’s
candidate a chance to convince them to switch parties in this election, so they are not “swing voters.” In
contrast, if Ψ = 0, knowledge of a voter’s issue preferences does not help to predict voting behavior – all
voters are ex-ante open to both candidates.
Figure 5 shows the development of Ψ over the last 10 presidential elections, and the parallels to cultural
polarization in Figure 3 are quite obvious. Ψ decreases from 1972 to 1976 (to around 0.35), and then
increases substantially throughout our observation period to end at a level of about 0.58. In other words,
17In most years in the NES, all observations have the same sample weight, in which case wi = 1 and the term in the denominator
is simply the number of voters.
23voters’ political issue preferences are a substantially better predictor of their voting behavior in the 2000s
than in the 1970s – knowing them allows about 65 percent better predictions in 2004 than it did in 1976.











Figure 5: Position predictiveness, 1972-2008, with 95% conﬁdence intervals
To put Figure 5 into historical context, note ﬁrst that the lowest value of Ψ occurs in the 1976 election
between Ford and Carter. From today’s perspective, Ford was clearly a moderate Republican. While Jimmy
Carter today is probably considered the most liberal president in the last 50 years, this reputation to a large
extent derives from his foreign policy positions (say, not bombing Iran in 1979, or being unusually critical of
Israel for a U.S. politician), and therefore may have been surprising to voters who probably expected Carter
(an evangelical Christian and Southern governor) to be a relatively conservative Democrat. It is therefore
plausible that the predictiveness of policy positions for vote choices is quite low in 1976.
A particularly large increase in Ψ occurs with Ronald Reagan’s ﬁrst presidential election in 1980. Rea-
gan’s success as a conservative is generally considered a key turning point in American politics and initiates
a process of ideological realignment of the parties, with liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats
switching party aﬃliations throughout the 1980s and 1990s. There is no signiﬁcant change in Ψ from 1980
to 1988, but the values in the next decade are somewhat higher. The next big increase in Ψ occurs in 2004.
While George W. Bush had campaigned as a “compassionate conservative” (i.e., a relatively moderate Re-
publican), his ﬁrst term showed that he was much more conservative than expected; moreover, in 2004, he
24ran against John Kerry, a very liberal Democrat. Thus, the resulting stark diﬀerence between candidates that
gave rise to the quote in the ﬁrst paragraph of the introduction (that “the 50-50 nation appears to be made up
of two big, separate voting blocks, with only a small number of swing voters in the middle”) is reﬂected by
the large increase in Ψ. Interestingly, Ψ remained at almost the same level in the 2008 election.
It is instructive to compare the development of predictiveness as shown in Figure 5 with diﬀerent mea-
sures of mass polarization in the literature. For example, the percentage of voters casting a straight ticket
for President and House (Hetherington 2001, Figure 3), and the percentage of respondents who perceive im-
portant diﬀerences between the parties (ibid., Figure 5) show a secular increase from the 1970s on, just like
Ψ. The same is true of the percentage of strong partisans (Bartels 2000, Figure 1) and the estimated impact
of party identiﬁcation on presidential voting (ibid., Figure 4).18 Overall, this external validation conﬁrms
that Ψ measures something that has been interpreted as mass polarization in the existing literature. The
main advantage of Ψ is, though, that we can decompose it to disentangle the eﬀects of elite polarization and
changes in the voters’ preference distribution. Evidently, this would be impossible for any of the measures
cited above, and we turn to this task next.
Our model suggests two distinct possible reasons for the deeper political divisions between voters re-
ﬂected in the increase of predictiveness: First, for a ﬁxed distribution of political preferences in society,
divergence of the two candidates’ policy platforms implies that every voter who is not exactly on the divid-
ing line moves more ﬁrmly into his ideologically preferred camp, in the sense that his probability of voting
for his ideologically-preferred party increases, while the likelihood of crossing-over because of idiosyncratic
preferences for the other candidate diminishes. Second, if we keep the candidates’ policy platforms ﬁxed,
but move voters’ ideal positions away from the dividing line, then the average preference of voters for their
ideologically closer party also increases. The ﬁrst eﬀect captures what we call sorting, while the second
one relates to the notion of voter polarization.19 Since we estimate the voter preference distribution and the
dividing line for each year, we can isolate these eﬀects: We can ﬁx the electorate in the previous election and
just focus on the change in sorting, or we can ﬁx the dividing line in the previous election and thus isolate
18The only substantial qualitative diﬀerence is for the 1972 election, which has no particularly remarkable feature in these 4
measures (and is often measured as less polarizing than 1976), but is identiﬁed as a considerably more polarizing election than
1976 by Ψ.
19Levendusky (2009) explains sorting and polarization using an example with three voter types, liberals, conservatives and
moderates. Suppose that in year t0 half of the liberals vote Republican and half of the conservatives vote Democratic, while in
year t1 all liberals vote Democratic and all conservative vote Republican. Then the electorate is more sorted in t1 than in t0, but
polarization has not changed since the number of voters of each type remained the same. In contrast, suppose that in year t1 there
are more conservatives and liberals, and fewer moderates than in t0. Then the electorate is more polarized in t1 than in t0.
25changes in voter polarization.
Formally, let Ψ(te,tp) denote the predictiveness for the electorate of year te if the politicians’ positions
are as in year tp. The total change in predictiveness in year t from the previous election in year t − 4 is
∆Ψt = Ψ(t,t)−Ψ(t−4,t−4). We call ∆S(t) ≡ Ψ(t−4,t)−Ψ(t−4,t−4) the level of sorting in year t, taking
as given the base electorate of the last election. The remaining change in Ψ in comparison to the last year is
due to polarization, measured as ∆P(t) ≡ Ψ(t,t) − Ψ(t − 4,t).








































Figure 6: Sorting and polarization contributions to position predictiveness, 1972-2008, by election (left) and
cumulative relative to 1976 (right)
The left panel of Figure 6 plots ∆S(t) and ∆P(t) to decompose the change in predictiveness into polar-
ization and sorting. Since we do not have data for 1968 (i.e., the election before 1972), the left panel starts
from 1976. Note that, in those years where both polarization and sorting increase (1984, 1992, 2004), we
draw the eﬀects stacked above each other so that the height of the column in these years is equal to the whole
eﬀect (i.e., ∆Ψt). In the other years, both polarization and sorting are drawn starting from zero, and the total
change in ∆Ψt is equal to the diﬀerence between the positive and the negative column. The right panel
presents the same information in a diﬀerent way, plotting the aggregate change of polarization and sorting,




i=1976 ∆P(i); the values for 1972 are just the negative of the values for 1972 in the left panel.
It is apparent from the left panel that sorting is more volatile than polarization: Sorting increases in
ﬁve elections, and decreases in four elections, while polarization increases in most elections, though usually
by a small amount. Also, the average absolute change in sorting is considerably larger than the average
26absolute change in polarization. This is intuitive because changes in sorting are caused by changes in the
distance between the candidates’ positions from year to year, and since the candidates change from election
to election, while the electorate remains mostly the same as in the previous election, it is very plausible that
there are much larger swings possible in sorting than in polarization.
Sorting decreases sharply in 1976 (i.e., going from Nixon vs. McGovern to Ford vs. Carter) and re-
bounds sharply in 1980 (Reagan vs. Carter). Somewhat surprisingly, the second largest increase in sorting
is in 1996 (Dole vs. Clinton) relative to 1992 (G.H.W. Bush vs Clinton). As a person, Dole does not nec-
essarily appear to be that much more polarizing than G.H.W. Bush. However, it could well be the case that
the ﬁrst term of Bill Clinton with the attempted health care overhaul, and the following take-over of the
House of Representatives by the Republicans lead by Newt Gingrich generated the perception among voters
of increased policy divergence between Democrats and Republicans, independent of the speciﬁc candidates
for the presidency. The values for the next two elections are consistent with the general perception among
political pundits: In 2000, the electorate was not perceived as polarized (and, in part, rather frustrated with
the small perceived policy diﬀerence between Bush and Gore), while 2004 was perceived as an election with
a stark policy contrast between Bush and Kerry.
Finally, it is useful to compare the aggregate contributions of sorting and polarization to predictiveness.
Of course, since polarization changes usually by a much smaller amount from election to election, and
the sign of the change in sorting is sometimes positive and sometimes negative, the aggregate numbers
depend a lot on the time period considered. Relative to 1976 as the base year, the aggregate sorting eﬀect is
considerably larger than the aggregate polarization eﬀect in all years, and sorting accounts for about three
quarters of the total change by 2008.20 However, the aggregate polarization eﬀect in the last three elections
(i.e., in 2008 relative to 1996) is considerably larger than the aggregate change in sorting during the same
time period. This may indicate that the elite polarization that started around 1980, apart and in addition to
its eﬀect on voter behavior, is eventually also having an eﬀect on the fundamental preferred policy positions
of the electorate. In this context, remember that the correlation between δ and θ takes its highest value in
2004 and 2008 (see Table 2 in Section 6.1), so voters who are socially conservative are also becoming more
ﬁscally conservative (and vice versa).
20Because the 1972 election was also very characterized by deep policy divisions, these numbers change signiﬁcantly when we
measure changes relative to 1972 instead of 1976. Predictiveness in 2008 is about one third higher than in 1972, with the increase
coming from polarization and sorting to about equal parts.
276.4 Relative importance of cultural and economic issues
We now turn to another interesting question: How did the relative importance of cultural and economic
issues for the determination of individuals’ voting behavior change from 1972 to 2008, and how did this
change aﬀect the behavior of diﬀerent voter types? Remember that we can interpret the slope of the dividing
line as a “marginal rate of substitution” between cultural and economic positions. If an individual on the
dividing line becomes one unit more culturally conservative, his economic liberalism needs to increase by k
units in order for him to remain stochastically indiﬀerent between the candidates.
Returning to Figure 4 in the preceding subsection with the 1976 and 2004 election, we see that the
slope of the dividing line, k, is low 1976: Voters split primarily along economic issues (with high θ types
mostly voting for Carter, and low θ types mostly voting for Ford). In contrast, in 2004, the separating line
is considerably steeper and thus, to a higher degree along cultural lines, with social liberals primarily voting
for Kerry, social conservatives for Bush.
Figure 7 displays the development of the slope k for all years. Given the values of δi and θi for each voter
in each year, we estimate the model given in equation (20), and use (21) to determine k and σ. After the ini-
tial decrease in k from 1972 to 1976, the relative importance of cultural issues starts to increase to reach high
points in 2000 and 2008. The conﬁdence intervals in Figure 7 clearly indicate that, while election-to-election
changes are often not statistically signiﬁcant, the long-term trend deﬁnitely is statistically signiﬁcant.








Figure 7: The development of k from 1972 to 2008, with 95% conﬁdence intervals
28Since the standard deviation of θ is about 10-20 percent larger than that of δ, a value of k around 1.1 or
1.2 would indicate that an increase of cultural conservatism by one standard deviation can approximately
be compensated by an increase in economic liberalism by one standard deviation, to leave the voter’s prob-
ability of voting Republican unaﬀected. In this sense, cultural and economic factors are roughly equally
important in the last elections, while in the 1970s, economic factors were substantially more important than
cultural ones.21
6.5 Voter Migration
The secular increase in k is accompanied by a downward trend in the intercept a, so that the dividing line
pivots around some center of gravity in the general neighborhood of the center of the voter preference
distribution. Thus, the change of the separating line aﬀects some voter types much more than others: Voters
whose ideological types are close to the pivot point remain more-or-less evenly split between both parties.
In contrast, an increase in k means that, to the right of the pivot point, voters become more likely to vote
Republican, and to the left of the pivot point, they become more likely to vote Democratic.
Speciﬁcally, the voters who move in the Republican direction are those with socially conservative, but
economically liberal views. It is tempting to identify these voters with what has been called “Reagan
Democrats” (we will discuss this in more detail in Section 6.6 below). Those voters who move in the oppo-
site direction, towards the Democrats, are voters with socially liberal and economically conservative views.
For example, it is often argued that a substantial number of professionals or ﬁnancial sector executives fall
into this group.
Figure 8 illustrates this eﬀect for the election with the largest increase in k, in 1980. Consider ﬁrst the
left panel. We draw the separating line of the 1976 election as a dashed line, and the 1980 one as a solid
line. The area between the dashed and solid lines shows the area of voter types that are most aﬀected. To
the Northeast of the intersection between the two separating lines, there are 18.6 percent of the electorate
who change from being more likely to vote for the Democrat in 1976 to being more likely to vote for the
Republican in 1980. Of course, due to the stochastic nature of voter preferences, not all voters in this area
change their actual vote (i.e., some may already have voted Republican in 1976, and others may continue
21Remember that this result is not a consequence of voters directly putting more weight on cultural issues now than they did in
the past, but rather follows from increased party divergence. Changes in the distribution of preferences are independent of these
changes in k.


















Figure 8: “Reagan Democrats” in the 1980 U.S. Presidential elections (left: actual separating lines; right:
valence-adjusted); Democratic voters: blue; Republican voters: red
to vote Democratic in 1980). However, in terms of their probability of switching allegiance, these are the
most aﬀected voters. They have a high θ, for example because of lower income or positive attitude towards
unions, but they are culturally conservative and many found Reagan’s cultural conservatism appealing. In
exchange for these voters, some ﬁscally-conservative but socially liberal voters might have migrated to the
Democrats, but in the NES sample, there was not a single voter in this region, resulting in a landslide victory
for Reagan.
Of course, focusing on the actual separating lines may be a bit misleading in that it conﬂates the eﬀects
of increased policy divergence on cultural issues (i.e., higher k) and changes in net valence: In addition to
emphasizing cultural conservatism, Reagan may also have been “better” than Carter; by itself, such a pure
valence diﬀerence results in a parallel upward shift of the separating line, and thus, in an increase of the
“Reagan Democrat” area (and a corresponding decrease of the “Wall Street Liberals” area). To correct for
this valence eﬀect, the right panel of Figure 8 shifts in parallel the separating lines such that they correspond
to a tied election, respectively.22 The Reagan Democrat area in the right panel is therefore the area of voters
who would (stochastically) switch from Democrats to Republicans just based on the new platforms, even if
valence is corrected in a way that keeps the parties’ vote shares constant. Again, it is evident that there are
22That is, we calculate a value of the intercept a such, if we substitute this value in (7) and sum over all voters, the expected
number of Republican voters equals that of Democratic voters.
30signiﬁcantly more voters in the Reagan Democrat area.
Finally, it is instructive to discuss why having a model with (at least) two policy dimensions is very
helpful for the analysis of voter migration. By contrast, consider what happens in a one-dimensional model
where voters have an ideal position in a liberal-conservative spectrum, as well as an idiosyncratic preference
shock like in our model. When comparing two tied elections (i.e., when adjusting the net valence just as we
did above), there is always the same cutoﬀ voter type such that voters who are more liberal are more likely
to vote for the Democrat, and those who are more conservative are more likely to vote for the Republican.
The only diﬀerence that can arise between overall tied elections is whether the percentage of liberals and
conservatives that vote for Democrats and Republicans, respectively, is very high (this will happen if there
are large policy diﬀerences between candidates) or barely higher than 1/2 (this will happen if the policy
diﬀerences are small). However, a type that votes predominantly Republican in a tied election can never
vote predominantly Democratic in another tied election – in contrast to our framework, such an event is
excluded by construction in a one-dimensional framework. Furthermore, systematic electoral shifts that
increase or decrease the republican vote share (induced by net changes in valence) must aﬀect all voter
types in the same direction, making all types either more or less likely to vote Republican.
6.6 Who is changing party preferences?
The question of the changing fault line through the electorate and the resulting voter migration is a highly
controversial issue in the study of American voting behavior. The term “Reagan Democrats” was originally
coined by Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg for the culturally conservative voters of Macomb County,
Michigan (largely white, unionized auto-workers). More recently, Journalist Thomas Frank (2004) has
written the bestseller “What’s the matter with Kansas?” in which he argues that white working class voters in
relatively poor states often vote for Republicans because Democrats became more similar to Republicans on
economic issues, and because their preferences on cultural issues such as abortion or gay marriage are more
closely aligned with Republicans: “The Democratic Leadership Council has long been pushing the party to
forget blue-collar workers and concentrate instead on recruiting aﬄuent white-collar professionals, who are
liberal on social issues. [...They] stand rock solid on, say, the pro-choice position while making endless
concessions on economic issues, on welfare, NAFTA, social security, labor law, privatization, deregulation
and the rest of it” (p. 243). “By dropping the class language that once distinguished them sharply from
Republicans they have left themselves vulnerable to cultural wedge issues like guns and abortion and the
31rest whose hallucinatory appeal would ordinarily be far overshadowed by material concerns.” (p.245)
Interpreted in terms of our model framework, we read Frank’s claim as follows: (1) Over time, the
policy diﬀerence between Democrats and Republicans has diminished on economic issues, and increased
on cultural “wedge” issues; (2) this change in the economic and cultural party platforms has induced some
“natural Democrats” (which Frank identiﬁes as the white working class) to switch to the Republicans.
Regarding the ﬁrst claim, remember that Figure 3 indicates that economic policy divergence was lowest
in the 1970s and thus has increased rather than decreased over this time period.23 However, this divergence
has been overshadowed by the relatively much larger increase in divergence on cultural issues. In relative
terms, Frank’s ﬁrst claim is correct: Policy diﬀerences on cultural issues have become more salient for the
distinction between Democrats and Republicans, and while economic issues are still very important for vote
choices, they have become relatively less important.
The analysis of the last subsection identiﬁes people who were most likely to switch from Democrats to
Republicans as those with culturally conservative, but economically liberal policy preferences. To evaluate
whether these party switchers are in fact predominantly the “Reagan Democrats” or “white working class
voters” that Greenberg and Frank talk about, some additional analysis is needed.
For each voter type (i.e., a (δ,θ) combination), we can calculate the probability that the type “moved”
from the Democrats in year t0 to the Republicans in year t1 as MD→R = (1 − Φt0)Φt1, where Φt is the
probability of voting Republican in year t. We can then rank all diﬀerent voter types that are present in
our sample of year t1 according to their value of MD→R (or the analogously deﬁned MR→D), and we will
consider the 5 or 10 percent of types that rank highest according to these measures as the “most likely party
switchers” (either in the Republican or in the Democratic direction). We will then analyze how these voter
types look demographically and in terms of issue preferences.24
Table 3 shows the 5 and 10 percent of most likely party switchers in the each direction, by income
category, race, education, occupation and social class. Voter types most likely to move in the Republican
direction ((ﬁrst two lines, our notion of “Reagan Democrats”) are considerably more likely to be lower
23Clearly, the extent and direction of economic policy divergence depends on what one considers as the base period. For example,
in the 2000 election (the last one before Frank wrote his book), economic divergence is in fact rather low and quite a bit lower than
in the 1980s.
24It is useful to think of Φt as the proportion of all those voters in the overall population (i.e., not just in the NES sample)
with a speciﬁc preference type who vote Republican in year t. However, one should not necessarily think of M as the transition
probability of a speciﬁc individual, especially from one election to the next, because the error terms ε of an individual voter may be
intertemporally correlated (nothing in our estimation procedure needs to be adapted if they are, because the NES data are anyway
just sequential cross sections rather than panel data).
32Income Income Income Income Race: High School Prof. Work. U. Mid.
< 16% 17–33% 34–67% >67% White or less & Man. Class Class
All % 10.6 15.7 34.1 39.5 75.1 28.0 41.6 28.4 18.1
D % 13.4 18.0 34.6 33.9 64.0 28.6 47.7 35.0 15.9
R % 7.9 13.4 33.7 45.0 85.9 27.5 35.7 22.0 20.3
D⇒R 10.7 28.6 42.9 17.9 89.3 50.0 21.4 42.9 7.1
Top 5% –/–/– */–/** –/–/– **/*/*** **/***/– ***/***/*** **/***/* */–/** */–/**
D⇒R 5.3 33.3 38.6 22.8 84.2 49.1 21.1 42.1 8.8
Top 10% –/**/– **/**/*** –/–/– **/–/*** **/***/– ***/**/*** ***/***/** **/–/*** **/*/**
R⇒D 3.6 0.0 42.9 53.6 71.4 10.7 60.7 14.3 25.0
Top 5% */**/– ***/***/*** –/–/– */**/– –/–/* **/**/** **/*/*** **/***/– –/–/–
R⇒D 7.0 1.8 31.6 59.6 68.4 12.3 66.7 17.5 31.6
Top 10% */**/– ***/***/*** –/–/– **/***/– –/–/*** ***/***/** ***/***/*** **/***/– **/**/*
Table 3: Voter Migration: *, **, *** indicates whether the diﬀerence to all voters/Democrats/Republicans is
signiﬁcant at the 90%, 95% or 99% level.
middle class than the general population, with about 30 percent located between the 16th and the 33rd
percentile of the income distribution, and another 40 percent between the 33rd and the 67th percentile; in
contrast, fewer of them are either very poor or very rich. They are also signiﬁcantly whiter and less educated
than the population at-large: about 50 percent have high school or less as their highest degree, and they are
less likely to be in professional and managerial positions. They are also signiﬁcantly more likely to identify
as “working class” and less likely to identify as upper middle class (or upper class).25
In contrast, the voter types most likely to switch from Republicans to Democrats (i.e., “country club
liberals”, in the second two lines) are considerably more likely to be high income (54 or 60 percent from the
upper third of the income distribution), and considerably less likely to be low education than the population
at-large. They are also considerably more likely to be in professional and managerial positions.
Table 4 continues to provide some information about the behavior and the political points of view of
the two groups. Reagan Democrats are extremely unlikely to be agnostic or non-Christian, and they attend
church at least almost weekly substantially more often than the population at large (or even Republicans).
In contrast, the voters who are most likely to switch from Republicans to Democrats are more than twice
as likely than the average voter to be non-Christian or agnostic, and only about 15 percent of them attend
25We use question VCF0148 and take answers 1 and 2 (“working class” and “average working class”) as the dummy variable in
the penultimate column, and answers 6 and 7 (“upper middle class” and “upper class” as the dummy variable in the last column of
Table 3.
33Other/No Attends Low Therm. Abortion Bible Gays not
Religion Church Jews Never Literal Adopt
All % 16.5 38.1 2.8 11.6 30.8 47.0
Dem % 17.0 33.7 3.2 6.4 25.9 32.0
Rep % 16.0 42.5 2.4 16.7 35.5 61.7
Dem⇒Rep 3.6 57.1 14.3 42.9 60.7 89.3
Top 5.0% **/**/** **/**/* */*/* ***/***/*** ***/***/** ***/***/***
Dem⇒Rep 5.4 53.6 7.1 35.7 57.1 80.4
Top 10.0% ***/***/*** **/***/* */*/* ***/***/*** ***/***/** ***/***/***
Rep⇒Dem 35.7 14.3 3.6 0.0 7.1 14.3
Top 5.0% **/**/** ***/***/*** –/–/– ***/***/*** ***/***/*** ***/**/***
Rep⇒Dem 32.1 16.1 1.8 0.0 12.5 16.1
Top 10.0% **/**/** ***/***/*** –/–/– ***/***/*** ***/***/*** ***/***/***
Table 4: Voter Migration: *, **, *** indicates whether the diﬀerence to all voters/Democrats/Republicans is
signiﬁcant at the 90%, 95% or 99% level.
church often. Reagan Democrats are also signiﬁcantly more likely to “feel cold” about Jews (thermometer
score of 49 or less) than the general population; the 5 percent of the electorate most likely to switch from
Democrats to Republicans accounts for a quarter of all voters who “feel cold” about Jews.
The diﬀerence in religiosity between the two switching groups is also reﬂected in attitudes. None of the
10percentoftheelectoratewhoweidentiﬁedasmostlikelytoswitchtotheDemocratsbelievesthatabortion
should be always illegal, while around 40 percent of Reagan Democrats do (by comparison, only every sixth
Republican voter holds this point of view). Similarly glaring diﬀerences obtain for the question whether
the whole Bible is literally true, and whether gay couples should be allowed to adopt children. Overall, the
voters most likely to have switched from the Democrats to the Republicans contain a large percentage of
extremely religiously and socially conservative voters, and the voters who are most likely to have switched
from Republicans to Democrats are mostly on the extreme liberal end of the cultural spectrum.26
Previous empirical analysis of Frank’s hypotheses. Thomas Frank’s book has stimulated substantial
research that critically examines some of Frank’s diagnosis and that we now discuss. Bartels (2006) uses
NES data to empirically analyze whether white working class voters attach more weight to social issues than
to economic issues, either absolutely or relative to other voters. Speciﬁcally, Bartels runs two regressions
26This is quite consistent anecdotal evidence about party switchers. For example, in 1988, Rick Perry was the Texas chairman of
the Al Gore campaign, while Jon Steward of the Daily Show recently admitted to having voted for George H.W. Bush for President
(see http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/22/entertainment/la-et-onthemedia-20110622).
34similar to those in our Table 1, one for college educated whites and one for non-college educated whites, and
then compares the regression coeﬃcients of the two regressions. In the terminology of our framework, this
approach tests whether diﬀerent subsets of voters are characterized by diﬀerent separating lines (speciﬁcally,
diﬀerent slopes k).27
Bartels ﬁnds that the regression coeﬃcients for most cultural issues are smaller among non-college
educated whites than among college-educated whites. On the other hand, non-college educated whites also
have generally smaller regression coeﬃcients for economic issues. Interpreted in our model framework, this
says that the vote-choice of college educated voters is determined by their preferred policy positions to a
larger extent than the vote-choice of non-college educated voters, and conversely, less by their idiosyncratic
preferences for the candidates. This is a very interesting and plausible ﬁnding, especially considering that
college educated voters may be better in ﬁguring out what the positions of the parties actually are. (We have
run a similar test on our data set and receive the same result).
However, whether the separating line has a diﬀerent slope among two groups only tells us whether
two individuals who have identical policy preferences but belong to diﬀerent groups would vote diﬀerently.
Independent of whether the two groups have the same separating line, the voting behavior of the average
group member can be aﬀected diﬀerentially by changes in the parties’ positions (and the resulting changes
in the separating line) if the distribution of preferences diﬀers between the two groups.
Figure 9 provides an intuition for why this is the case. There are two sets of voters that diﬀer in observ-
able characteristics — think “working class voters” and the complement set of “non- working class voters”
— but also in the distribution of voter preferences in each group (the color of the shading indicates the
density of voters, with darker shades denoting the areas with most voters). In each set, some voters vote
Democratic and some vote Republican, and this can be used to estimate a separating line, separately for each
group. This provides us with k1 and k2, the relative importance of cultural and economic issues in groups 1
and 2, respectively.
To keep things simple, suppose that we ﬁnd that the separating line between Democrats and Republicans
in each group is actually the same (so, k1 = k2). Does this mean that the behavior of voters is necessarily
aﬀected in the same way if k changes over time (again, remaining the same across the two groups)? Clearly,
given the way we have drawn the preference distributions for the two groups in Figure 9, the answer is neg-
27Bartels does not aggregate economic or cultural issues, and he does not argue based on relative importance of cultural and eco-
nomic issues, but rather focuses on absolute diﬀerences between the coeﬃcients of the same exogenous variable in both regressions.









Figure 9: Diﬀerential impact of increased importance of cultural issues in groups 1 (left) and 2 (right)
ative. In group 1, some voters change from Democrats to Republicans, and some change from Republicans
to Democrats. The gains and losses of each party in this group are approximately equal. Thus, if we just
look at the average propensity to vote republican in group 1, it would appear that it did not change at all
(although, of course, there are also migrations of group 1 voters, in both directions). In contrast, most of the
voter migration in group 2 is from Democrats to Republicans.
Thus, the following two statements are both true in Figure 9: (1) “Voters from group 2 have become
more supportive of Republicans because of an increased cultural polarization (or a decreased economic
diﬀerence) between parties” and (2) “The vote choice of voters in group 1 is determined by their cultural
and economic positions in the same way as the vote choice of voters in group 2.”
7 Robustness
7.1 Robustness to the selection of policy issues
Our measure of “cultural issues” is rather broad: It includes essentially all “non-economic” policy questions
that have been asked in the National Election Survey in all presidential election years from 1972 to 2008.
Much of the existing literature has focused instead on purely “moral” questions, i.e. excluding both racial
issues and those related to patriotism/militarism. For example, Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder (2006)
36ﬁnd that economic issues are at least twice as important as moral issues, but that the importance of moral
issues for vote choice has increased from close to zero in the 1970s and 80s to a nontrivial size in the latest
elections.
We include more than just “moral” issues in our cultural category, and this necessarily increases the
weight of that category and the overall explanatory power of the analysis. However, we will now show that
the main results of our analysis remain qualitatively unchanged if we reduce the variables in our “cultural”
category to the narrowly “moral” ones (abortion, role of women and church attendance). Figures 10, 11
and 12 are the analogues of Figures 3, 5, 7 and 6. The results display the same qualitative behavior as in























































































Figure 10: “Moral” and economic policy divergence of candidates, 1972 to 2008
the corresponding ﬁgures in the main text, but there are also some interesting diﬀerences. Figure 10 shows
that “moral” policy divergence increases even more dramatically than cultural policy divergence, reaching,
between 1996 and 2004, more than 600 percent of the diﬀerence in 1976. Moreover, there is a substantial
decline of moral policy divergence in 2008.
The values of Ψ display the same secular increase as with cultural issues, but, as expected, the values are
somewhat lower. Also, k increases steadily from a low in 1976, but the numerical value of k is substantially
lower than in the basic model – clearly, when only “moral issues” are included, the importance of this
category relative to the unchanged economic category is lower. Finally, decomposing the increase in Ψ into
changes in sorting and polarization in Figure 12 shows essentially the same picture as for general cultural
issues in Figure 6.



















Figure 11: Position predictiveness and relative importance of moral and economic issues



















































































Figure 12: Contributions of sorting and polarization to position predictiveness, by election (left) and cumu-
lative (right) (cultural issues restricted to purely moral ones)
7.2 Restricting the set of voters
Several papers in the existing literature look at the question whether diﬀerent subsets of voters such as
working class voters and those with college education diﬀer in what determines their vote choice. That is,
do the estimated coeﬃcients for the same variables in probit regressions on diﬀerent subsets of voters diﬀer
in size? There are diﬀerent interesting partitions that one could look at: For example, does the separating
line diﬀer by income, race or gender? How does the standard error of ξ diﬀer by the voters’ educational
level? In principle, we can analyze these questions in our framework. A practical problem is, however, that
38focusing on subsets of voters reduces the respective sample size substantially and thus, the size of conﬁdence
intervals increases substantially so that it is often impossible to know whether estimated diﬀerences in Ψ or k
in diﬀerent subsets are due to real diﬀerences in the underlying true parameters, or due to random variations.
For example, one of the secular changes in the U.S. political landscape is the partisan realignment of in
the former confederate states. After the Civil War and Reconstruction periods, most Southern whites felt an
animosity against the Republican party, and in the 1930s, Roosevelt managed to include Southern whites in
his New Deal coalition. As a consequence, the Deep South remained one of the most Democratic regions of
the country for the next generation. Thus, during this time, both parties had culturally conservative wings.
Following the civil rights legislation of the 1960s, a large block of social conservatives (white, southern
evangelicals) migrated to Republican party. This partisan realignment of the South proceeds throughout
the period we consider in our paper. The reader may therefore wonder whether our results pick up this
realignment of voters, rather than a change in the position of parties. However, for all years, there is no k
for any subset of voters (either Southerners or Northerners) that is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the k for the
whole United States. Details are available from the authors upon request.
7.3 Changes in the Variance of Valence ξ
In our analysis in Section 6, we assume that the standard deviation of ξ does not change over the sample
years.28 In a probit model that analyzes data from only one year, the assumption that the residual error is
drawn from a standard normal distribution is a mere normalization – if we write the minimization problem
of a probit regression, but assume that the probability of voting Republican is Φσ(α + βx) (where Φσ is
the cdf of a N(0,σ) distributed random variable), then the objective function is homogeneous of degree
zero in (α,β,σ). Thus, σ is not determined and can be normalized to one, without loss of generality. In
contrast, we look at a sequence of years. Of course, the argument above holds for each year, but since we
want to interpret the change of regression coeﬃcients (or functions of regression coeﬃcients) over time,
we eﬀectively have assumed that the standard deviation of idiosyncratic preference shocks is constant over
time. This is a standard assumption when the analysis is based on a comparison of regression coeﬃcients
over time (e.g. Bartels 2006, McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006) and usually not even discussed.
If the standard deviation of idiosyncratic preference shocks is constant over time, we can interpret our
28We donotneed tomake anyassumptionaboutthe average value ofξ inthepopulation, i.e. theaverage net valence ofcandidates
is allowed to vary over time.
39empirical results as evidence of policy divergence. If, instead, one allows for σξ to vary over time, the
interpretation of the policy divergence results can change; for example, if one were to assume that σξ
decreased considerably over time (i.e., the size of the average idiosyncratic preference shock decreased),
thenonewouldhavetothinkofoverallpolicydivergencebetweenpartiesasrelativelyconstant(thoughthere
still would have to be an increase of cultural divergence relative to economic divergence). If, instead, σξ
increases over time, the divergence eﬀects would be magniﬁed relative to the basic model. The mathematical
logic behind our model (and, more generally, intertemporal probit models) does not allow us to isolate one
of these interpretations as the “true” one any more than a relativist physicist can determine an absolute
coordinate system.29
This said, what is a natural way of thinking about the temporal development of σξ in our context? The
net-valence term ξ is determined by the voters’ interpretation of candidate traits that are not directly linked
to the candidate’s economic or cultural platform, and the NES contains several question about such charac-
teristics that go back suﬃciently many years to enable a comparison across diﬀerent elections: VCF0354 –
VCF0356 and VCF0366 – VCF0366 ask, respectively, whether the Democrat and Republican presidential
candidates are knowledgeable, moral and provide strong leadership. Each of these variables is measured
on a 4-point scale, and if we denote the responses of voter j to the questions about the Democratic and












i,t) is a useful
proxy that is proportional to the net valence of the Democratic candidate that voter j perceives. We can then






t ))2] for the presidential election years from 1980
(the ﬁrst year for which these data are available) to 2008, which gives the following values: 3.10, 3.00, 2.62,
3.08 3.13 3.20, 4.21, and 4.05.
The solid line in Figure 13 recalculates the time series from Figure 3 in Section 6, using these standard
deviations for σξ. For comparison, we plot the values derived from assuming that σ(ξ) is constant (i.e., the
values of Section 6) as a dashed line. Note that the two curves are very close to each other until 2000, and
thus, the overall picture of the development until this time is qualitatively unchanged. However, for 2004
and 2008, the adjusted curve displays even more policy divergence than in the basic model where σξ is
assumed to be constant.
29I.e., if the physicist pushes the gas pedal in a car, does the car accelerate in the direction it is pointing, or does the car stand still,
but the trees move faster in the opposite direction? Modern physics is built on the notion that there is no absolute coordinate system,
so we cannot say which of the two statements is in any absolute sense “true”, but it is still the case that certain interpretations are
more natural than others in certain applications.



































































Figure 13: Cultural and economic policy divergence of candidates, 1972 to 2008, when σξ changes. Dashed
line: constant σξ.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze some of the central questions in American political behavior. Do voters increas-
ingly split along ideological lines, and if so, what does their behavior tell us about the underlying fundamen-
tal causes? Are voters today more polarized than they were a generation ago, or do they just appear more
polarized because they face more polarizing choices? And, if the types of voters that support the two parties,
respectively, have changed over the long run, who has become more Democratic and who has become more
Republican?
When candidate positions are very similar, then voters choose candidates primarily based on non-policy
attributes. This is true even if voters would, in principle, care a lot about policy — if there is no meaningful
policy diﬀerence between candidates, the voters cannot express the direction or intensity of their policy
preferences through the act of voting for one of the candidates. In contrast, more divergence between party
positions translates into a starker choice for voters, and one that is inﬂuenced more by the voters’ ideal
positions relative to the candidates.
Our formal model shows that we can recover the extent and the direction of policy divergence from
the voting behavior of voters whose ideal positions we know from their answers to policy question in the
National Election Survey. Our empirical results show that Democrats and Republicans have diverged sub-
stantially since the mid-1970s, in particular on cultural, but also on economic issues. As a consequence,
41policy positions have become signiﬁcantly and substantially more important for the determination of voting
behavior. Most of this eﬀect is due to increased “sorting” because of increased policy divergence between
the parties, but our model can also identify some “electoral polarization,” mostly due to the fact that the
voters’ ideal economic and cultural positions have become more strongly correlated recently.
Finally, our results resolve a seeming paradox in the existing literature. Political pundits often claim
that, over the last generation, the Republican party gained substantial support by their increased emphasis on
cultural issues which appealed to “Reagan Democrats” — socially conservative voters who previously voted
Democratic because of their economically liberal preferences. Yet, convincing political science research
appears to show that working class voters do not put more emphasis on social issues than other groups of
voters. Our model shows why these claims can be logically consistent with each other. Statements about the
weights of diﬀerent issues for diﬀerent groups of voters deal with the question how voters trade-oﬀ policy
diﬀerencesbetweentheirownpreferredpositionsandthoseofthecandidates, andthemarginaltrade-oﬀmay
very well be the same for two very distinct groups. The reason why certain segments of the electorate move
in the Republican direction is that they are socially conservative and the social policy diﬀerence between
parties has increased, and not because they “care more” about these issues than other voters (in the sense of
having a higher weight on these issues when deciding whom to vote for).
We show empirically that the voters whose behavior is most likely to be aﬀected by the change in
the fault line brought about by the parties’ changing positions in fact display many of the characteristics
stipulated by the informal literature. The voters who our model predicts to have (probabilistically) shifted
from Republicans to Democrats are signiﬁcantly better educated, likely to be in professional or managerial
positions, are more agnostic, and more liberal in terms of gay rights and abortion than the population at
large; and those voters who have moved in the opposite direction, from Democrats to Republicans, display
the opposite characteristics: They are less educated, lower-middle class (but not poor), and are more likely
to be religious fundamentalists.
Our methods are, of course, applicable to other data sets and the question of “polarization” in other
countries. In particular, it would be very interesting to analyze whether the developments that we identiﬁed
for the US in the last generation – policy divergence between parties, and stronger divergence on cultural
issues than on economic ones – are also reﬂected in other countries (and in other voting systems such as
proportional representation), or whether the experience in the United States is unique in this respect. Such
a cross-country comparison will be instrumental for ﬁnding out the root cause for the development – why
42is it that parties have diverged over the last generation? And, is this a bad development that should be
corrected (and, if so, how?), or is the increased extent of choice between parties actually a desirable feature.
Evidently, these are some very fundamental questions that will require a lot more work, but we hope that
the instruments that we have developed in this paper will prove useful in this long-term project.
43Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Let NΛ be the set of all i with ˜ λi < 0. Then let Xi = 1 − ˜ Xi if i ∈ NΛ, and Xi = ˜ Xi,
otherwise.
Similarly, let NM be the set of all i with ˜ µi < 0. Then let Yi = 1 − ˜ Yi if i ∈ NM, and Yi = ˜ Yi, otherwise.
Note that ˜ λi ˜ Xi = −˜ λi(1− ˜ Xi)+ ˜ λi. Thus, for i ∈ NΛ we get ˜ λi ˜ Xi = λiXi
Pn
i=1 |˜ λi|+ ˜ λi. For i < NΛ it follows
that ˜ λi ˜ Xi = λiXi
Pn
i=1 |˜ λi|. Similarly, ˜ µi ˜ Yi = µiYi
Pm
i=1 |˜ µi| + ˜ µi for i ∈ NM and ˜ µi ˜ Yi = µiYi
Pm




























i=1 λiXi, and θ =
Pm
i=1 µiYi equation (23) immediately implies (14).
It remains to prove that the modiﬁed model corresponds to the original model.
Note that (18) and (16) imply
at
σt
= ˜ at − (1 + ρt)
m X
i=1





































































α0 = ρ0 = 0. Then, (25), and (26) imply

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where the last equality follows from (24). The two models are therefore equivalent.
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